We study the diffusion of hybrid vehicles among consumers. Using data on sales of 11 different models over seven years, we identify the effect of the penetration rate -total cumulative hybrid sales per capita -on new hybrid purchases. The penetration rate significantly affects new purchases, and the effect differs by hybrid model. In particular, we find a positive diffusion effect from the Toyota Prius and a negative diffusion effect from the Honda Insight, with elasticities of 0.23 to 0.85 for the Prius and -0.08 to -0.32 for the Insight. This finding is consistent with our model of model-specific learning along with anecdotal evidence that early Insight models were perceived to be of lower quality than Prius models. Higher Insight penetration rates gave a negative signal about hybrid quality and inhibited rather than promoted hybrid adoption. The findings are relevant for policy designed to promote new technologies.
Hybrid electric vehicles are alternatives to conventional, internal combustion engine automobiles that achieve higher fuel economy by combining a conventional engine with a rechargeable battery. The increased fuel economy of hybrids is attractive because of concerns about both climate change and energy security. Transportation accounts for almost one-half of US carbon dioxide emissions, and almost one-half of all petroleum consumed in the US ends up as motor gasoline. Hybrid cars are capturing an increasing share of the domestic automobile market, rising from 0.4% of all retail sales in May 2004 to 3.6% in July 2009. As hybrids are a small but growing component of the vehicle fleet, and may be a significant component of a national strategy to deal with climate or energy security, it is important to know what influences consumers' decisions to buy hybrids rather than conventional vehicles. Because hybrids are a newer technology, issues arise that are similar to those involved with the diffusion of all new technologies.
Few studies have examined the determinants of hybrid adoption. This paucity is partly explained by the lack of significant data on this new technology. 1 The purpose of this paper is to study the diffusion of hybrid cars among consumers, and in particular to estimate the effects of learning on consumers' decisions to adopt hybrid cars. We use data on new sales of 11 different hybrid models at the state-quarter level from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] and estimate a diffusion model, where the decision to purchase a hybrid is affected by economic incentives, including the price of gasoline and tax incentives for hybrids, as well as the cumulative penetration rate of hybrid vehicles in a particular state. We also present a model of Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) examine the role that state and federal incentives, gas prices, and consumer preferences have on hybrid adoption. All three had positive effects, but the magnitude was largest for gas prices and consumer preferences. Kahn (2007) uses data from California and finds that environmentalists, as proxied by a community's share of Green Party voters, are more likely to drive hybrids. On the other hand, many other examples of technological diffusion have been widely studied. For example, Andonova (2006) and Iimi (2005) study the diffusion of cellular phones, and Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) study the diffusion of home computers. As that final paper emphasizes, learning plays an important role in new technology diffusion. consumer choice between hybrids and conventional cars, where learning about the quality of hybrids overall or a particular make or model of hybrid affects the agent's decision-making. This paper relate to two strands of literature: on the diffusion of hybrid cars in particular and on technological diffusion in general. We add to the small literature on the determinants of hybrid adoption by considering also the important features of uncertainty about quality and learning for this type of durable good. This paper also adds to the large literature on technological diffusion by considering the case of uncertainty and heterogeneous quality.
Different makes and models of hybrids have varying qualities, and consumers get different signals about hybrid quality from their exposure to different types of vehicles. By taking advantage of the variance in perceived quality across models, we can measure how different signals of quality differentially affect consumer take-up.
The first two hybrid models available to American consumers were the Honda Insight and the Toyota Prius, both first introduced in 2000. The Insight initially dominated the market but was soon overtaken by the Prius, and the Insight eventually was discontinued in 2006. 2 Our theoretical model describes the intuition behind our empirical results. In a discrete choice framework where consumers are uncertain about the quality of their options, more signals that a particular technology is of high quality lead to a higher probability of choosing that technology. Alternatively, signals that the technology is low quality reduce the probability.
Signal strength can vary with technology and manufacturer; a signal from one car gives more information about another car from the same manufacturer than it does about a car from a different manufacturer. Thus, more positive signals from a particular technology increase the probability of choosing a same manufacturer's technology more than they increase the probability of choosing another manufacturer's technology. A dynamic extension of the model We document and exploit between-state variation in the initial penetration rates of these two models.
In states with relatively more Priuses, consumers were more likely to encounter a Prius, and their beliefs on the quality of hybrid cars were impacted by their exposure to the Prius. We test if the difference between states in the rate of exposure to the Prius and the Insight subsequently affect consumer purchases of hybrids, which we expect if the two models differ in quality and provide signals of hybrid quality. demonstrates how the signaling effect decays over time; eventually all consumers are sufficiently knowledgeable about all technologies and no longer rely on the signals.
Empirically, we find significant diffusion effects for hybrid cars that differ by model. A higher Prius penetration rate leads to more purchases of all models of hybrids, whereas a higher Insight penetration rate leads to fewer purchases. We estimate that the elasticity of hybrid sales with respect to the market penetration of the Prius in a state is 0.85, whereas the elasticity with respect to the market penetration of the Insight is -0.32. Our explanation is that the Insight sends a "bad" signal about hybrid quality and the Prius sends a "good" signal. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the Insight was perceived to be of lower quality than the Prius. Articles in the popular press and reviews from Consumer Reports buttress this claim.
We also find patterns consistent with consumers' inference of both model-quality and technology-quality; Prius penetration has a large positive effect on Prius sales, but also has a positive effect on all other hybrid sales as well. Insight penetration, on the other hand, has a large negative effect on subsequent sales that seems to be largely specific to the Insight. The discrete choice model that we develop with learning about differentiated technologies demonstrates how signals from different hybrid models can have these differential effects.
The first section below summarizes the literature on hybrid cars and technological diffusion. The second section presents our models of hybrid diffusion. In the third section we describe our data set, and in the fourth section we present our results. The final section concludes.
I. Previous Literature
Conventional automobiles are powered by an internal combustion engine (ICE) running on gasoline or diesel fuel. Battery electric vehicles are powered by rechargeable battery packs, but typically have less acceleration performance and limited mileage between charge-ups.
Though electric vehicles have zero emissions, the electricity generated to recharge the batteries is usually produced by burning fossil fuels. Taking this into account, electric vehicles still produce less carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions per mile. A hybrid electric vehicle combines the two types of propulsion systems, where the ICE can be used to recharge the battery as well. Furthermore, hybrids can capture some of the energy that is wasted in conventional cars, such as from braking, and use that to recharge, improving their fuel economy even further. Hybrids lack the disadvantage of battery-only electric vehicles of having limited mileage between lengthy recharges. Some hybrids can also be made to "plug in," so that the battery can be recharged either by the ICE or from the electricity from a wall socket. Plug-in hybrids, though, were not commercially available during our sample period and thus are not represented in our data set.
Though hybrids have been produced for more than 100 years, at least since Ferdinand Porsche designed the "Mixte" in 1901, they have not been widely commercially available until the late 1990s, when the Toyota Prius and the Honda Insight were introduced. The 2010 model year features 27 hybrid models. The Prius is the most popular model, surpassing one million worldwide cumulative sales in May 2008, and is the most fuel efficient car sold in the US, according to the EPA.
Because of the small market share and the recent introduction of hybrids, few economics papers study these cars specifically. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) examine the effect of federal, state and local incentives on consumer hybrid adoption. Using the same data set that we describe here below, they estimate how much of the growth in hybrid adoption is due to these incentives, how much is due to gasoline prices, and how much to preferences for the environmental and energy security. Each of these factors has a significant effect, with preferences and gasoline prices having the largest. Preferences are proxied for by per-capita Sierra Club membership, quarterly deviation from average temperatures (to measure the salience of climate change) and per capital military participation and war casualties (to measure salience of anti-war sentiment). Sallee (2008) also focuses on tax incentives for hybrid cars but estimates the incidence of those incentives specifically for sales of the Toyota Prius. He finds that consumers captured a majority of the subsidies, despite the fact that Toyota faced capacity constraints because of excess demand for the Prius during his period of analysis. The offered explanation is that an increase in retail price would have reduced future demand, and so dynamic considerations led to Toyota declining to capture the subsidies. Kahn (2007) estimates the effect of preferences for environmental quality on hybrid purchases. Using data from California and proxying for environmentalism with a community's share of Green Party voters, he finds that environmentalists are more likely to buy hybrids, as well as use public transit and consume less gasoline. De Haan et. al. (2006) use Swiss data on buyers of the Prius to test for evidence of a rebound effect from its purchase. While the most apparent rebound effect is probably the decision to drive more miles in a car that is more fuel efficient, they do not test for this effect (since they lack data on miles driven). Rather, they test for two other rebound effects. First, hybrid buyers could have switched from already fuel-efficient cars to the Prius. Second, average vehicle ownership could increase, if hybrid buyers are using the hybrid in addition to, rather than instead of, another car. They find no evidence of either rebound effect from a survey of 367 Prius buyers. Lamberson (2009) fits data on aggregate US hybrid sales to two diffusion models:
the Bass model and the Gompertz model. The Gompertz model forecasts higher future growth rates of the hybrid market and is more consistent with industry expectations. 3
The diffusion of a new technology through the economy is an important question and one especially relevant to climate policy. Not only hybrid cars, but low carbon technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) are potentially essential ingredients to an effective policy regime to combat climate change. Though the economics literature is sparse when it comes to hybrid cars, it is fortunately rich with papers that study the diffusion of other technologies. Geroski (2000) provides a survey of the literature on technological diffusion, and he focuses on explanations of the dominant stylized fact: the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an S-curve. Of particular interest in our paper is the effect of learning and externalities on the diffusion of technologies. Manski (2000) reviews the literature on social interactions in general, where the actions of some users may affect the actions or outcomes of other users. Heidhues and Melissas (2006) provide a model of technology adoption with cohort and network effects. Peer effects have also recently been studied in the choice of employee retirement plans (Duflo and Saez 2002) , health care plans (Sorensen 2006) , and medical procedures in developing countries (Kremer and Miguel 2007) . Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) look for learning and networking effects in the diffusion of a consumer technology, home computers. Using cross-sectional data on 110,000 households in 1997, they find spillover effects from computer users: households are more likely to buy home computers in areas where more of their neighbors own computers. This peer effect is larger for heavy computer users and with use of the internet and email, consistent with network effects.
A focus of our empirical analysis is heterogeneity in the new technology. How do different models of hybrid cars differentially affect diffusion among consumers? Models of the diffusion of heterogeneous technologies extend back at least to Jensen (1983) , who models a firm's choice among two competing technologies, about which firms are uncertain. In Jensen's model, adopting one technology gives the firm information about its quality, which the firm uses to update its prior beliefs about that quality. Colombo and Mosconi (1995) and Stoneman and Toivanen (1997) They use bottom-up engineering estimates of cost functions for various abatement technologies and simulate how different policies would affect diffusion of these technologies in the energy industry. Rose and Joskow (1990) also study the diffusion of new technologies in the electricity generation industry. They find that larger firms and investor owned utilities are more likely to adopt new technologies than are smaller or publicly owned firms.
II. Model of Diffusion and Learning
We present a model of hybrid vehicle adoption that captures inferential learning.
Prospective hybrid vehicle buyers observe vehicles on the road and from their observations update prior beliefs about hybrid quality. We first develop a static model in which the comparative statics are easy to derive. We then generalize the model by allowing consumers to dynamically optimize, to investigate diffusion over time. Our model incorporates both "epidemic" learning effects from Griliches (1957) and choice among competing technologies as in Jensen (1983) . We focus on consumer decisions and disregard other issues, including producer pricing decisions.
First consider a static discrete choice model. Consumers choose the vehicle with the highest utility, where the utility to consumer i of purchasing vehicle J j ∈ is given by
where X j is a vector of vehicle attributes, ε ij is a mean-zero IID error term with a Type I extreme value distribution, and j ηˆ is the consumer's assessment of the quality of hybrid vehicle j, normalizing the quality of non-hybrid vehicles to zero. The true quality of hybrid j, unobservable to the consumer, is η j .
Consumer i receives n unbiased, independent signals of vehicle quality, {ω i1 ,…,ω in }.
Each signal gives information on one model -if the kth signal is about model j then ω ik = η j + ν, where η j is the true quality of vehicle j and ν ~ N(0, σ j 2 ). These signals can be thought of as , where α > β to indicate that he weights these signals less than signals from vehicles made by the same manufacturer.
The probability that consumer i purchases vehicle j, conditional on consumer i's signals Ω i , is given by the standard multinomial logit expression:
The last equality holds because the signals Ω i determine all . Supposing that the realization of the signals observed only by the individual, one may instead want to know the probability that consumer i purchases vehicle j conditional only on the initial market shares of the vehicles. Let s be a vector representing the initial market share distribution, and let be a vector representing the individual's assessment of quality for all vehicles. Then
The function f is the probability density function of the vector conditional on the vector of market shares s. In general, this integral will not have a closed form solution and must instead be simulated. We impose additional assumptions here to find an analytical solution (these assumptions will be dropped in the dynamic model below). First, we suppose that σ j 2 = 0 for all models j, so signals contain no noise. Then the must take discrete values, and we can calculate their probability mass function. Second, assume that the number of signals n equals one. Then, the number of possible signal combinations is just the number of models. Third, assume that only four car models exist. Model a is a non-hybrid. Model b is a hybrid manufactured by firm Y. Models c and d are hybrids manufactured by firm Z. Let the initial shares of models be given by s a , s b , s c , and s d , which determine the probability of any set of signals Ω i . Then the probability of purchasing hybrid model c, say, is given by
We are interested in how this probability changes with the initial distribution of the models.
Since all of the shares must sum to one, we replace s a with 1 -s b -s c -s d . Thus, we consider a marginal increase in s c accompanied by a marginal decrease in s a and the resulting effect on hybrid purchase probabilities.
First consider the effect of this change in the initial distribution on the probability of purchasing model c: (Pr c |ω=η c ) -(Pr c |ω=η a ). Evaluating and simplifying yields
The constant A is positive. The entire expression is positive if and only if η c > η 0 . When the true quality of hybrid c is higher than the prior belief about hybrid quality, then the probability of purchasing c will increase when more c models initially are present compared to nonhybrids. Intuitively, the increase in c models relative to non-hybrids gives a higher probability of getting the signal about c compared to getting no signal (from interacting with a non-hybrid owner). If this signal is higher than the prior, then it will increase the probability of buying c.
We also investigate how this increase in the initial share of model c affects the probabilities of purchasing other hybrids. Consider its effect on model d, the other hybrid made by the same manufacturer. The effect is (Pr d |ω=η c ) -(Pr d |ω=η a ), which can be simplified to Third, hybrid c gives a stronger positive quality signal about other hybrids of the same manufacturer, d, making consumers more likely to buy d (the "manufacturer signal" effect). In the expression for dPr c /ds c from the paragraph above, all three of these effects are positive; here the "model signal" effect is negative.
Finally, consider the effect of an increase in the initial share of c on sales of hybrid b, the hybrid made by a different manufacturer than c. The marginal effect is
where C is a positive constant. The first line of this expression is positive whenever η c > η o , and the second and third are negative whenever η c > η o . All three lines are analogous to the corresponding lines in the previous expression and the effects they represent. However, the sign of the third term (the "manufacturer signal" effect) is reversed. Hybrid c gives a weaker signal about hybrid b than it does about hybrid d, and thus the manufacturer signal effect makes consumers less likely to buy hybrids from manufacturers other than the maker of c. Now we explicitly consider the dynamic decisions that consumers face over the purchase of durable automobiles. We now allow for multiple signals (n > 1) with noise (σ j 2 > 0), but we assume that vehicles come in just three models: a non-hybrid model a and two hybrid models, is 6%. The curves labeled "binit09" and "binit11" correspond to initial starting shares for model b of 9% and 11%, respectively.
In simulations with a higher initial share of model b, consumers are more likely to get a signal of hybrid quality from model b than they are to get a signal from model c. Because the true quality of model b is lower than that of model c, the resultant subjective assessment of quality ηˆ is lower in simulations with a higher initial share of model b. Thus, we would expect that a higher initial share of b leads to lower adoption of both types of hybrids. This is just what we see in Figure 1 , where the simulation with the lowest initial share of model b, 3%, shortly thereafter has the highest hybrid penetration rate. The simulations with higher initial shares of model b, from 6% to 11%, have lower hybrid penetration rates. Note also that this effect is temporary; the hybrid shares converge around period 20 and subsequently bounce around due to the randomness in the simulations. Eventually, the effect of the initial distribution on consumers' assessments of hybrid quality vanishes, because after enough time has passed most consumers have had the opportunity to accurately assess the quality of both hybrid models. 5
The models formalize some intuition about how heterogeneous quality among a new technology is relevant to its diffusion. An available technology is adopted by consumers not just when they are exposed to it, but when they are convinced that it will increase their utility. Being exposed to different models of hybrids with varying qualities will lead to different outcomes for future adoption; e.g., being exposed to a low-quality hybrid will make you less likely to buy that hybrid and may make you less likely to buy any hybrid. Furthermore, this spillover signaling effect should be stronger for hybrids from the same manufacturer then for hybrids from different manufacturers, if consumers believe that hybrid quality is positively correlated among models of a single manufacturer. We will test these predictions using our data set of new hybrid sales.
III. Data and Empirical Strategy
We use the same data set as Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) , where a more detailed description of the data is available. Under what scenario would the exclusion assumption be violated? Suppose there is a demand shock for relatively fuel efficient cars in some state in 1999 (say a gasoline tax increase).
Toyota and Honda registrations in 1999 will go up, since these cars are relatively fuel efficient.
If this demand shock is persistent (say, the tax increase in permanent), then the demand for hybrids cars in future periods will go up as well, since hybrids are relatively fuel efficient. Thus, the instrument directly affects the dependent variable. We are confident that this violation of the exclusion assumption is not realized. First, the particular mechanism for the fuel efficiency demand shock is controlled for in our regressions; we have state-quarter level data on net-of-tax gasoline prices. Second, our instruments capture the relative difference in demand between Toyotas and Hondas. Both of these manufacturers' cars are relatively fuel efficient compared to the average car on the road in the US. We do not expect that a fuel economy demand shock would relatively favor one manufacturer over the other, a claim that we could not make if the two manufacturers were, say, Honda and Ford. In other words, we do not attribute the difference between Honda and Toyota registrations in 1999 to fuel demand shocks alone. Instead, we attribute the difference to potentially unobservable factors that affect only relative demands for cars of those two manufacturers, such as the strength of dealership networks and underlying consumer brand preferences.
Our empirical strategy exploits variation in early penetration rates of the Insight and the Prius across states. Figure 3 provides 
IV. Results
We first test to see if initial Prius and Insight adoption is correlated with subsequent The base case regression results are presented in Table 2 . We present three specifications. The first column presents results from a basic OLS regression with state-and time-fixed effects. However, even if the fixed-effects strategy overcomes our identification concerns described above, we must still account for serial correlation in the error structure because of the dynamic panel structure of the data. (Specification tests reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.) Thus, in column 2 we employ a fixed effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression to allow a general form of error structure. 9 Table 2 demonstrates how different models can impart different signals about unknown hybrid quality and thus lead to different diffusion rates. In all columns, the coefficient on the log of the Prius penetration rate is significantly positive, with an estimated elasticity between 0.23 and 0.85. The coefficient on the log of the Insight penetration rate is negative in all columns, ranging from -0.08 to -0.32, with statistical significance ranging from the 10% level to the 1% level. Some of the demographic and incentive variables also impact hybrid vehicle sales. States with higher income residents and with younger residents tend to have higher hybrid sales.
Higher hybrid sales are also associated with higher gasoline prices and higher values of tax incentives for hybrid purchases, reinforcing results found in Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) .
Curiously, a higher score for a congressional delegation by the League of Conservation Voters, indicating a more environmentally-friendly voting record, is associated with a lower propensity to buy hybrids. The effect is small but significant.
Finally, column 3 present results from the IV strategy described above. First-stage IV results are presented in Appendix Table 2 .
In all specifications, all of the state-quarter level demographic data, gasoline prices and taxincentive data are included. In columns 1 and 3, standard errors are clustered at the state level, while column 2's regression allows a more general error structure. All regressions include stateand time-fixed effects.
The results from Table 2 are consistent with the theory presented above about heterogeneous quality of a new technology as well as anecdotal evidence from model sales and from stories in the media about the relative quality of these two models. The Prius appears to have provided a positive signal -initial Prius sales are positively correlated with subsequent hybrid vehicle adoption. In addition, we find some evidence that suggests the Insight provided a negative signal of hybrid quality -we estimate that a ten percent increase in Insight sales are negatively correlated with a three percent reduction in subsequent adoption. 2000) . The review claims that the Prius is the first hybrid that can "seriously compete with conventional cars." It is called "a worthy contender and a legitimate choice for everyday use." The Insight, on the other hand, was cited for "a lack of accommodations, comfort, and drivability;" the ride is "barely tolerable." Also, the Insight's design, compared to the more conventional Prius, may have doomed it (Patton 2007) . 10 The resulting coefficients again support the positive signal arising from the Prius. The negative coefficient on Insight penetration is smaller and not distinguishable from zero.
In column 2, we return to the state-quarter level, but we include a linear state-specific time trend in addition to a state-fixed effect. Thus, not only do different states have different preferences for hybrids, but these preferences are allowed to vary linearly over time at different rates. We identify a diffusion effect off of the deviation from this state-level linear trend. We again see a significant positive Prius effect, though of a smaller magnitude and at a lower level of significance compared to the results without the time trend. 11
We have chosen to include only Prius and Insight penetration levels on the right-handside of the regression equations because they were the first two models introduced and dominated the market for the first three years of the sample. Thus, we believe that any signaling effect from seeing hybrids would come from these models. Nine other hybrid models are present in our sample, and in theory we could put any combination of these models on the right hand side. For almost all other models, though, their late introduction and small representation among
The Insight effect is negative and of the same magnitude as the results without the time trend, but the standard error is large enough to make it statistically indistinguishable from zero.
states mean that there is insufficient power in the regressions to identify any effect. The only exception may be the Honda Civic hybrid. It was introduced in 2002 Q1, the third year of our sample. By 2003 Q1, its market share of new sales was 49.9%. Column 3 thus replicates the fixed effect IV regressions including the log of Civic penetration as an endogenous regressor.
The set of instruments is the same as in Table 2 's regression. The coefficient on Civic penetration is not significantly different from zero. The Prius coefficient is still significantly positive, and the Insight coefficient is still negative, here with a somewhat higher significance than in the rest of Table 3 . 12 Overall, the robustness checks in Table 3 provide more strong evidence of the positive diffusion effect from Priuses, and more but weak evidence of a negative diffusion effect from Insights.
Heterogeneous Effects by Manufacturer
We extend the regression strategy to estimate manufacturer-specific effects. If consumers believe that the quality of Toyota hybrids are correlated due to perhaps similar technology, a high quality signal from a Prius may provide a stronger signal of high quality for other Toyota models than for models of other manufacturers. Similarly, a bad quality signal from an Insight may have a stronger negative effect on other Honda models than on models of other manufacturers. 13
12 Some other specifications that include Civic penetration show a slightly negative and barely significant coefficient on Civic penetration. The coefficient on Prius penetration is always significantly positive, and the coefficient on Insight penetration is always significantly negative.
We test this prediction in Table 4 . As in the previous regressions, the dependent variable is the log of hybrid vehicle sales. The regressions are run at the state-quartermodel level, as in column 1 of and Insights (negative), and smaller and less significant "other vehicle, same engine type" and "other engine type" coefficients for both models.
Persistence
Finally, we examine whether the effect of the initial mix of hybrid vehicles persists over time. In traditional models of adoption, slow initial uptake retards consumer learning and consequently slows subsequent adoption. By contrast, two aspects of our model suggest that the effect of the initial mix of Priuses and Insights will decay over time. First, as hybrid vehicles become more prevalent, consumers are more able to infer model-specific quality separately from the mean quality of hybrid vehicles. For example, if a consumer only has experience with the Insight, she may be unable to determine whether her impression of the Insight is specific to that model or more generally indicative of overall hybrid quality. As more models become available, the consumer receives signals about more vehicles and can better infer vehicle-specific deviations from mean hybrid vehicle quality. Consequently, prospective buyers will be less likely to misattribute a signal from a low-quality (or high-quality) vehicle to all hybrid models. Second, our model explicitly allows consumers to respond dynamically to information.
Prospective hybrid buyers may choose to postpone purchases until a later date if they lack sufficient information to evaluate the quality of a hybrid vehicle. Both of these effects imply that in a state with a high initial mix of Insights relative to Priuses, we will see slow hybrid vehicle adoption for a period of time. As more models are introduced and consumer information improves, we expect that adoption accelerates in these states and may, after time, catch up to states with a greater initial proportion of Priuses.
We compare hybrid vehicle adoption in states with initially high Prius market share ("Prius-intensive") and states with initially high Insight market share ("Insight-intensive"). To investigate persistence, we interact time fixed effects with two measures of the initial hybrid vehicle market share of Insights. The first measure is a simple dummy variable categorizing states above and below the median Insight market share in the fourth quarter of 2001. We The empirical persistence patterns displayed in Figure 5 are consistent with the predictions of the dynamic model, displayed in Figure 1 . The simulation results in Figure 1 suggest that the effect of a higher than average share of a low quality signal hybrid diminishes over time; by period 20 all of the simulations have converged. The results in Figure 5 also suggest that the negative effect of a high initial Insight penetration rate bottoms out after about two years, though it does not completely dissipate even six years on.
V. Conclusion
Hybrid electric vehicles are capturing an increasing share of the domestic automobile Our identification strategy exploits variation in early penetration rates of the Prius and the Insight across states. This variation is substantial, as evinced in Figures 3 and 4 . We thus would like to think of this analysis as a quasi-experiment, where different penetration rates are randomly allocated to different states and we study the effects on subsequent hybrid purchases.
This variation is not random, though, and we employ instrumental variables to identify a causal effect. We instrument for these initial allocations using the relative distribution of non-hybrid Toyota and Honda models. States may have preferences for one manufacturer over another, or a particular manufacturer may have a better distribution system in place in some places, leading to higher penetration rates of hybrid models.
We have identified an effect from lagged penetration rates on adoption of new hybrid cars that differs by model and manufacturer. We have also provided a theoretical model of learning and technological uncertainty that is consistent with this empirical result. However, the empirical result could be explained by other factors besides learning effects. For example, network externalities may be present; higher hybrid penetration in a state may lead to more mechanics able to service hybrids, which would lower their cost in that state and increase adoption. Our empirical strategy cannot disentangle the learning explanation provided by our model from competing explanations of the diffusion patterns that we see. 15 Our findings are relevant to technology policy, especially policy intended to encourage low-carbon technologies. Policies like tax incentives impact consumers' decisions to buy hybrid cars (Gallagher and Muehlegger 2008) . They presumably will have similar impacts on consumers' decisions on even newer technologies, like plug-in hybrid cars, electric cars, or home electrical smart meters.
A useful extension to this paper would be to use additional data to attempt to separate these effects. Notes: Simulation results presented from dynamic model, described in the Appendix. Four simulations are presented. Initial share of hybrids in fleet is set to 21% in all simulations, but the distribution between hybrids b and c differ among simulations. In simulation "binit03," the initial share of b hybrids is 3%, leaving 18% for hybrid c; in simulation "binit06," the initial share of b hybrids is 6%, leaving 15% for hybrid c, and so on. 
Figure 5
Note: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the time indicator and the indicator variable for Insight-intensive state, from the regressions presented in Table 5 , columns 1 and 2. Insightintensive states are defined by having an Insight market share greater than the median value (39.9%) in 2001 Q4. For presentation, the first period coefficient is omitted.
Notes: "Insight-intensive" states are those whose share of hybrid vehicle sales in 2001 Q4 is above the median share of 39.9%; "Prius-intensive" states are all others. 
Appendix: Dynamic Model
The utility that consumer i receives from a new vehicle j in period t is given by
where f is a utility function, X j is a vector of observable qualities of vehicle j and η j is the unobservable quality of vehicle j.
In each period, consumer i receives n different unbiased, independent signals of vehicle quality, {ω i1 ,…,ω in }. Information accumulates over time; we denote Ω it to be the set of n·t vehicle-signals that a consumer has received from period 1 to period t.
Consumers beliefs about the unknown η j formed from their set of observations at time t,
Ω it take the same form as in the static model. In addition to signals of vehicle quality, a consumer can perfectly observe η j through ownership. Let m it be the vehicle that consumer i owns in period t, and let M it = {m it , m it-1 , … m i1 } be the set of all vehicles that she has owned up through period t. In period t, consumer i has perfect information on any vehicle model in it it it three vehicle models. Consumers maximize total discounted utility with an infinite-horizon and a discount factor β. We use value function iteration to solve the model through simulation.
The model can be simulated in the following way. We first choose parameter values.
These include X j and θ, the observable quality components of each model and their contributions to utility (in fact, we need only a scalar V j for each model to capture this term).
They also include p, the price of purchasing a new car, δ, the depreciation rate, the true values of the unobservable hybrid quality components η a and η b , the prior belief of hybrid quality η 0 , the weight on a signal of hybrid quality from the other hybrid model car α, and the form of the utility function f. In addition to parameter values, we also set initial conditions, that is, the initial distribution of models and ages of models in the economy. Thus m i1 and v i1 are initial conditions that must be determined before the simulation. We choose a number of consumers in the economy N and a number of time periods to simulate T. Given these parameters and initial conditions, we randomly draw the shocks ω it and can simulate consumer decisions.
The parameter values that are used throughout the simulations are listed in Appendix Table 1 . Most of the parameter values are arbitrary. Note that η a = 0, so that the unobserved quality of hybrid model a is identical to the unobserved quality of the non-hybrid (which is normalized to zero). Note also that η b = -0.25, so that the unobserved quality if hybrid b is less than either the other hybrid or the non-hybrid. Model b thus represents a low-quality hybrid.
Finally, note that η 0 = -0.2, so that the prior belief of an individual, before observing either hybrid model, is that its quality is slightly worse than that of a non-hybrid. 
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